After
Action Report 1 – 28
February 1945 Corps
Reserve
1 Feb – 6 Feb Heckhuscheid-Hill
568 Offensive 7 Feb – 11 Feb Berg-Lutzkampen
Defensive 12 Feb – 15 Feb Leidenborn-Reiff
Offensive 16 Feb – 23 Feb Corps
Reserve
24 Feb – 28 Feb 1
February 1945 At the
beginning of this period the 11th Armored Division, with 613 officers and 9,642
EM, was in VIII Corps reserve with the mission of remaining in place prepared
to exploit any penetration of the enemy defenses which might result from the
Corps attack then in progress. Periodic liaison was being maintained with the
4th, 90th, and 87th Infantry Divisions which were making the attack, and the
95th Infantry Division also in Corps reserve. The attack to the east, generally
along the high ground west of the Our River, was continuing against resistance
varying from light to heavy, depending on the nearness of the Siegfried Line.
In no sector was any German tank activity reported. The Division was organized
as follows: CCA CCB CCA HQ
& HQ Co CCB HQ & HQ Co 42nd Tk
Bn 21st AIB 63rd
AIB 41st Tk Bn A Co
56th Armd Engr Bn 22nd Tk Bn 490th
AFA D Trp
41st Cav Rcn Sq A Co
81st Med Bn C Btry
575th AAA Bn CCR Div Arty Res
Comd HQ Div Arty HQ & HQ Btry 55th
AIB 491st AFA 492nd AFA Division
Troops Division Trains Div HQ
& HQ Co Div Tns HQ & HQ Co 151st
Armd Sig Co 133rd Ord Maint Bn 811th
TD Bn 81st Armd Med Bn 41st
Cav Rcn Sq (-) 56th
Armd Engr Bn (-) 575th
AAA Bn (-) The
major units prepared for future operations by making route reconnaissance and
periodic contacts with the inf Divs attacking. CP’s of major units were located
as follows: Division
Forward Echelon – Isle La Hesse (1 km W of Bastogne) CCA –
Buret CCB –
Bercheux CCR –
Magerotte Division
Artillery – Recogne Division
Trains – Vaux Les Rosieres The
56th Engineer reconnaissance parties continued checking of roads and bridges
behind the advancing divisions of the VIII Corps, and cleared a minefield at
Monaville. Training
Memo #1 was issued stressing: Personal
rehabilitation and maintenance of materiel. Physical
conditioning. Test
firing of all new weapons. Special
training for reinforcements. Preparation
and conduct by major units of small unit tank and infantry combat training
exercises. 2 February
1945 Division
units remained in place and continued training, rehabilitation and maintenance.
The day’s activity was highlighted by tank-infantry assault problems in CCA and
CCR areas, and a demonstration of advance guard employment technique by CCB.
The 56th Engrs continued their mission of checking roads and bridges behind the
attacking Inf Divs of VIII Corps. 3
February 1945 The
VIII Corps was now focusing its attention on a section of the Siegfried Line in
Germany proper, having been ordered to attack east across the Our River by 0400
6 Feb. to penetrate the Siegfried Line and to capture Prum and Pronsfeld. The
attack was to be made with divisions abreast - north to south – 87th Inf Div,
4th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, and 11th Armored Division (less CCA). The 4th Inf
Div was to capture Prumand secure a bridgehead across the Prum River. The 90th
Inf Div was ordered to capture Pronsfeld, while the 87th Inf Div was ordered to
seize a tactically important road junction. The
11th AD was ordered to relieve elements of the 90th Inf Div in the southern
part of its zone not later than 2400 5 Feb, and to attack 0400 6 Feb to seize
and hold Hill 568 for the protection of the 90th Inf Div’s south flank. Hill
568 is a dominant terrain feature within the Siegfried Line approximately three
km east of Grosskampinberg commanding the area in all directions. During the
operation, contact was to be maintained with the 90th on the left and with III
Corps on the right flank. The Division was also responsible for the protection
of the Corps right (S) flank. A
Letter of Instructions was issued placing a considerable infantry task force at
the disposal of CCR, and assigning to it the limited objective attack mission
of taking Hill 568. CCR was re-constituted as follows: Hq Res
Comd C Co 56th Armd Engr Bn 21st
AIB D Btry 575th AAA Bn 55th
AIB B Co 602nd TD Bn 63rd
AIB Det 151st Armd Sig Co B Co
22nd Tk Bn Det 133rd Ord Maint Bn A &
B Trps 41st Cav B
Company of the 81st Med Bn was placed in support of CCR. CCA was
held out as Corps Reserve, while CCB was charged with protecting the static
Corps south flank. Div Arty was ordered to establish an advance FDC in the zone
of relief, place the 492nd AFA Bn in direct support of CCR, and move the 491st
AFA Bn sufficiently far forward to support CCR. In addition, VIII Corps and III
Corps Artillery were to be tied in and available on call. The
811th TD Bn was released from its attachment to the 11th AD at 0800 and the
602nd TD Bn (-C Co) was attached to the Division at the same time. Meanwhile
during the day the Corps attack under its FO #7 continued. The 87th Inf Div
encountered light to moderate resistance with the enemy apparently withdrawing
toward the Siegfried Line. The town of Roth was capture. The 4th Inf Div
continued its advance encountering heavy resistance at Bieialf before seizing
the town at 1020. Hatenfeld and Perthachat were seized and occupied against
light resistance. The 90th Inf Div reported enemy activity restricted to minor
patrol encounters. 4
February 1945 At 0700
CCR moved from Magerotte, assembling its troops enroute along the axis
Bastogne-Wicrenge-Trois Vierges, and re-assembled east of Burg Reuland late in
the afternoon where the Command Post was established. Through rain and thawing
snow the 21st and 63rd AIBs moved up to the line and under cover of darkness
relieved elements of the 90th Inf Div along the rim of the high ground east of
the Our River. On the south flank elements of the 41st Cavalry anchored their
position to the Our River. At 1500
CCA was alerted for movement to a Corps Reserve assembly area in the vicinity
of Schlierbach. Shortly thereafter VIII Corps postponed this and other moves of
Division elements from 24 to 48 hours due to assault force road priorities. 5
February 1945 With
Div Arty in place, responsibility for the Division zone was assumed from the
90th Inf Div at daybreak. The
enemy line was defined as the western boundary of the Siegfried Line. From a
captured map showing pillbox locations in the Siegfried Line our forces had
accurate information of the enemy’s dispositions. Outposts were maintained all
along key terrain features to hinder our advance prior to reaching the
Siegfried Line proper. At
1200, FO #11, HQ 11th Armd Div, was issued confirming previous verbal orders
concerning the attack for 0400 6 Feb, and constituting major forces as follows: CCA CCB HQ
& HQ Co CCA HQ
& HQ Co CCB 63rd
AIB 22nd
Tk Bn (-B Co) 42nd Tk
Bn 41st
Tk Bn D Trp
41st Cav B Co 56th Engr Bn A Co
56th Engr Bn
A Btry 575th
AAA Bn C Btry
575th AAA Bn A Co
81st Med Bn Det
133rd Ord Maint Bn CCR Division
Artillery HQ Res
Comd HQ
& HQ Btry Div Arty 21st
AIB 490th
AFA 55th
AIB 491st
AFA 41st
Cav (-) 492nd AFA B Co
22nd Tk Bn D
Btry 575th AAA Bn C Co
56th Engr Bn B Co
602nd TD Bn Det
151st Sig Co B Co
81st Med Bn Det
133rd Ord Bn CCA was
ordered to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of Cronbach on division
order and await further orders in Corps reserve. To make up a balanced combat
command, the 63rf AIB was to revert to the control of CCA in place, upon relief
by the 55th AIB, and then move to the CCA assembly area on order. CCB was
directed to assemble in the vicinity of Weiswampach on order and to protect the
right (S) flank of Corps. CCR was given the mission of occupying and defending
along its line in the division zone, attacking 0400 6 Feb to capture and hold
Hill 568 and contain the enemy in zone; and maintain contact with the 90th Inf
Div on the left (N) flank and the III Corps on the right (S) flank. Div Arty
was directed to backup the attack of CCR with the 492nd in direct support, the
490th and 491st AFAs in general support; the artillery to be so disposed as to
be able to mass fires along the left (N) flank of the division zone through the
division objective. Most of
the rainy day was spent in regrouping and preparation for the Corps coordinated
attack scheduled for 0400 6 Feb. The 55th AIB relieved the 63rd AIB in place,
and elements of the 41st Cav relieved C Co of the 56th Armd Engr Bn on the
south flank of the division zone, as infantry weight was concentrated on the
north flank opposite the key Hill 568. The 41st Cav was assigned the mission of
protecting the southern and central portions of the division zone. Flank
contact with the 6th Armored Division of III Corps on the south and the 90th
Inf Div on the north was maintained. Div Arty HQ moved to Burg Reuland,
arriving at 1200. The division CP moved by infiltration to Wilwerdange opening
at 1630. 6
February 1945 CCR
launched its attack on Hill 568 at 0400 with the 55th and 21st AIBs abreast,
the 21st making the main effort on the left. No artillery preparation was
fired. As a result of exceptionally accurate and detailed intelligence of
identifications, strength, and disposition of occupied pillboxes, complete
surprise of the enemy was accomplished and our forces advanced swiftly through
fortified, mined, and booby-trapped areas to seize an occupy the division
objective by 0830. This action represented an advance of approximately two
miles through the Siegfried Line. Patrols were sent out to the south and
southwest and promptly drew fire from enemy small arms and automatic weapons. Patrols
of the 41st Cav advanced to the towns of Berg, Grosskampenberg, and Lutzkampen
during the morning. Heavy enemy artillery and mortar concentrations on
Grosskampenberg and Lutzkampen caused our forces to withdraw from those towns.
Observation posts were established on the wooded heights one km NW of
Lutzkampen. Possession of Berg was retained. CCA
moved to its new assembly area and established its command post at Cronbach
about 1915. In
accordance with verbal instructions from VIII Corps, Operations Memo #23 was
issued by HQ 11th Armored Division at 1600 directing a continuance of the
Siegfried Line penetration action and defeat of the enemy in the Division Zone.
CCR was ordered to attack 7 Feb to capture in succession Eschfeld, Binscheid,
and Lichtenborn. CCB was ordered to move to an assembly area near Weiswampach.
The 56th Engr Bn was ordered to move to Beiler from Isle Le Pres. CCR
held its position under heavy nebelwerfer, artillery, and mortar fire. C Co
56th Engrs cleared roads of mines n rear of the infantry elements. On the left
flank, elements of the 90th Inf Div were unable to gain any ground. After
nightfall, enemy infiltration around both open flanks caused considerable
disturbance. 7
February 1945 Due to
stiff resistance, the 90th Inf Div’s early morning attack failed to progress to
a position offering protection to CCR’s north flank. For this reason, CCR
delayed its scheduled attack and dug in further to improve its position. The
55th AIB and 21st AIB received artillery fire during the night and repulsed an
enemy counterattack of company strength on the left flank at 0430. Frontal and
flanking small arms, mortar, an machine gun fire were place on our positions
during the morning. Tanks and tank destroyers were moved forward to strengthen
the Hill 568 strong point and infantry pulled back to a more secure reverse
slope position. At mid-day propaganda leaflets were fired on enemy positions
and a psychological address was broadcast over a public address system,
inaugurating a psychological warfare campaign, which during the next several
days urged the surrender of German soldiers hopelessly left to defend isolated
pillboxes. Division
Artillery continued to support CCR, massing fires on targets of opportunity and
firing harassing and interdiction missions. Artillery fire was a deciding
factor in repulsing the 0430 enemy counterattack on the north flank of CCR.
Some counter-battery fire was placed on he enemy position firing on CCR
infantry with good results. 41st
Cavalry elements continued to hold commanding terrain at the western outskirts
of Lutzkampen and Grosskampenberg. Considerable enemy fire fell in the
villages. CCA released D Troop 41st Cav to Squadron control at 0700. The troop,
needed for rotation of units in the line, moved to Stupbach, closing at 1500.
Lutzkampen was re-entered and occupied at 1815 and our forces took 20 enlisted
and 10 officers prisoners of war. Elements of the 41st Cav remained on the
western side of Grosskampenberg, organizing the advantageous terrain. The
56th Armd Engr Bn (-) reached its new assembly area near Beiler at 0945. the
381st QM Trk Co moved by infiltration during the day to Drinkange and elements
of A Co 133rd Ord Maint Bn moved to Asselborn, also by infiltration. CCB, in a
well coordinated march, moved from Bercheux to the vicinity of Weiswampach
along the axis Bercheux-Bastogne-Trois Viergies-Weiswampach, closing at 1210. D
Co 41st Tk Bn moved to Leithum, prepared to support CCR from the west side of
the Our River in the southern half of its zone. Two Sections of B Btry 575th
AAA Bn reached Hulfange at 1645 to afford protection for the airstrip. Melting
snow and rain was rapidly transforming all roads in the division area into
great morasses of mud as the over-soaked thin foundations started giving way
under continual concentrated use by large numbers of heavy tracked combat
vehicles. Verbal
instructions for continuance of the attack early 8 Feb were received from VIII
Corps at 1600. Shortly thereafter CCR was so directed, being also cautioned o
coordinate their action with the 90th Inf Div. 8
February 1945 Fighting
through a heavily fortified and hotly defended valley, the 90th Inf Div attack
still did not bring their line forward abreast of the CCR Hill 568 position.
Accordingly, CCR restricted its action to limited dismounted patrol activity.
Moderate small arms, mortar, and artillery fire fell on forward positions
throughout the period. Using a combination of the public address system and
leaflets fired by Div Arty, psychological offensive action was renewed at 1550
with good results. C Co 56th Engr Bn continued road clearance and repair, working
against a steadily deteriorating situation. Several vehicles and an angle dozer
were lost during the day to enemy mines. From
well-established observation points artillery fire was directed between showers
on enemy infantry patrols, known strong points, and a small concentration of
enemy armor in the vicinity of Kesfeld. The
41st Cavalry moved its command post to a concrete pillbox about mid-morning. D
Troop, supported by F Troop, relieved A Troop in Lutzkampen. Military
Government detachments made their first contacts with the German civilian
population as Lutzkampen came into firm possession. C Troop continued
patrolling on the south flank in the vicinity of Sevenig. CCB
established and maintained contact with elements of the 6th Armored Division west
of the Our River on the south flank. One section of A Btry 575th AA Bn, posted
along the Weiswampach-Peterskirche road, received approximately twenty rounds
of enemy artillery fire at 1400. At 1445
instructions were received from VIII Corps to continue the attack 9 February.
Infantry elements in forward positions were beginning to show the results of
long exposure, and accordingly orders were issued returning the 63rd AIB to CCR
for rotation of infantry units. For direct fire reduction of pillboxes, C Btry,
174th FA Bn was attached in place at 2130. Late in
the day reports from the 90th Inf Div indicated that reduction of two or three
pillboxes would have to be accomplished before lateral contact with the Hill
568 position could be established. CCR was directed to coordinate with the 90th
Inf Div on the renewal of directed offensive action the following day. 9
February 1945 CCA
released the 63rd AIB to the control of CCR at 0001. Reconnaissance for routes
and areas for possible future operations continued. Vehicular maintenance,
installation of track extensions, and removal of camouflage whitewash from all
vehicles was accomplished during the day. CCB continued to maintain contact
with the 6th Armored Division on the south and bolstered the south flank with
additional troops on the west side of the Our River. Limited
patrol activity was continued by CCR, still waiting for the 90th Inf Div
elements to seal off one of its two exposed flanks. Another psychological
warfare attack was launched at 1330, employing both artillery leaflets and a
public address system. Moderate enemy artillery fire was received throughout
the day, increasing to heavy concentrations while the psychological warfare
broadcast took place. The 63rd AIB reached its concentration area at 1315 and
completed relief of the 21st AIB in place at 1715. the 21st AIB moved to a
reserve position at Heckhalenfeld. At 1655 contact was finally established with
the 90th Inf Div, as their forces came abreast. Div
Arty continued its support of CCR, firing leaflet, harassing, and interdiction
missions as well on numerous targets of opportunity. C Btry 174th FA Bn was
moved into position. At 2220
an anticipatory FO from VIII Corps was received. The temporary assumption of a
defensive attitude by the Corps after the capture of Prum and seizure of the
Prum River line was specified. With a general shift of sectors to the south the
11th AD was to be relieved by the 90th Inf Div and assembled in Corps reserve,
prepared to repel any enemy counterattack in the Corps zone. 10
February 1945 CCR
resumed the ground attack at 0900. C Co of the refreshed 63rd AIB reduced ten
additional fortified places, five pillboxes, and five bunkers to the south and
southeast of Hill 568. After capture, the bunkers and pillboxes were dynamited
and rendered useless. 15 PWs were captured. In coordination with CCR’s attack,
Div Arty fired 64 missions for a total of 852 rounds on targets of opportunity,
harassment and interdiction. Fifty additional rounds containing surrender
leaflets were fired on isolated pillboxes during the morning hours. The
thawing and rainy weather continued. Road conditions throughout the entire VIII
Corps zone reached such a critical stage that orders were issued to all units
limiting movement to absolutely essential tactical and administrative vehicles.
To help alleviate the road situation, the 56th Engrs, plus additional troops
from major and attaché units, were put to work on 24-hour road repair details. The
capture of Prum and seizure of the Prum River line having been accomplished by
other elements of the Corps during the day, at 1800 11th Armored Division FO
#12 was issued to comply with VIII Corps FO #9 received the previous evening.
Due to the road situation minimum movement of CCR elements only was directed. Five
days fighting in the Siegfried Line resulted in the losses and accomplishments
comparatively tabulated below: Personnel Our Own Enemy KIA 17 Killed & Wounded 100 WIA 190 Prisoners
287 Missing 1
TOTAL
387 TOTAL 208 Vehicles
and Weapons Our Own Enemy Halftracks 1 Tanks 5 Dozer 1 GP
Vehicles 1 GP
Vehicles 3 AT
Gun 1 TOTAL 5
TOTAL 7 Pillboxes
& Bunkers Cleared 21st
AIB 16 55th
AIB 11 63rd
AIB 10 TOTAL 37 11
February 1945 In
conformance with the ordered adjustment in sectors, CCR was contacted by
elements of the 90th Inf Div during the day and relief arrangements made. B Co
56th Bn moved back west of the Our River around mid-day. At 1700 the 21st AIB
commenced its move to the CCB assembly area at Weiswampach, closing at 2130.
TIME 2015,
VIII Corps modified orders were received as FO #10. The 11th Armored Division
(less the 41st Cavalry Recon Squadron was assigned a new zone for defense,
involving a shift to the south and the relief of certain elements of the 6th
Armored Division without delay. Contact was to be maintained with 90th Inf Div
on our left (NE) flank, and the Division was to be prepared to resume the
offensive on short notice. Confirming
verbal fragmentary orders, Operations Memorandum #25 was issued at 2210,
directing reconstitution of the major commands as follows: CCA CCB Hq
& HQ Co CCA Hq
& HQ Co CCB 42nd Tk
Bn 22nd
Tk Bn A Co
56th Engr Bn 41st Tk Bn C Btry
575th AAA Bn 21st AIB A Co
81st Armd Med Bn B Co 56th Engr Bn Det
133rd Ord Main Bn A Btry 575th AAA Bn Det
133rd Ord Maint Bn CCR Division
Artillery HQ Res
Comd Hq
& HQ Btry Div Arty 55th
AIB 490th
AFA 63rd
AIB 491st
AFA C Co
56th Engr Bn 492nd AFA B Co
22nd Tk Bn C
Btry 174th FA Bn B Co
602nd TD Bn D Btry 575th AAA Bn B Co
81st Med Bn Still
shifting to the south, CCB was directed to occupy and defend the southern
portion of the new zone, and CCR, upon relief in its then position by the 90th
Inf Div, to occupy and defend the zone then held by the 41st Cav. Div Arty was
directed to support CCB and CCR in defense of the zone. 41st Cavalry, upon relief
by CCR, was to pass to operational control of the 6th Armored Divison.
12
February 1945 Relief
of CCR’s Armored Infantry Battalions by elements of the 90th Inf div was
completed at 0130. The 63rd AIB in turn completed the relief of the 41st Cav by
0645. The 41st Cav initiated its move south to the 6th Armored Division sector
at 0800, clearing the division sector at about 1045. The
490th AFA moved to positions near Breidfeld and assumed the direct support
mission for CCB. Division Artillery fire missions were concentrated during the
front line relief period. CCB
initiated reconnaissance for relief of elements of the 6th Armored Division in
its extended zone to the south. The 21st AIB completed relief of the 6th
Armored Division at 2300. The 56th Engr Bn reinforced by the 381st QM Trk Co
and an additional divisional work detail of 225 men, was fully employed on
axial road repair in the division area. A Company cleared 400 mines from a
field NW of Krumbach. Operations
Memo #26 was issued at 1930 directing a boundary adjustment between CCB and CCR
in order to eliminate the defensive complications incident to the occupation of
precipitous ground along the Our River. Both CCB and CCR were directed to
maintain scheduled patrol contact with each other at an established limiting
point. 13
February 1945 Committed
Division elements completed and improved defensive installations and maintained
contact with the 90th Inf Div and 6th Armd Div during this quiet day. Patrols
to the west bank of the Our River in the CCB sector met no resistance. Light
sporadic nebelwerfer, mortar, and artillery fire fell on CCR positions during
he day. DDA continues training of reinforcements, maintenance, and work on
roads in its vicinity. Div Arty fired 36 missions, expending 366 rounds,
including twenty rounds of surrender leaflets. The 56th Engr Bn continued to
direct and supervise major road repairs and maintenance. 14
February 1945 Platoon
strength counterattacks were made against CCR without loss on this rainy day.
CCB engaged in patrol activity only, maintaining contact with the 6h AD on the
south. Div Arty completed the first half of the month with its 695th mission.
The 56th Engr Bn continued its strenuous battle to repair and maintain roads. 15
February 1945 The
Division continued its defensive mission. Very little enemy activity was noted.
At 1200 FO #11 was issued by VIII Corps directing an attack to the SE at H-hour
18 Feb to clear enemy in the zone west of the Prum River and effect a junction
with the XII Corps in the vicinity of Mauel. At this time, VIII Corps was
operating as the northernmost Corps in the Third Army with V Corps of the First
Army on the north flank and XII Corps on the south flank. From S to N VIII
Corps troops were disposed as follows: 6th Cav Gp, 6th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div,
90th Inf Div, 4th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div. Field Order #11 directed the 11th
Armored Divison (- 41st Cav) to attack at H-hour 18 Feb to capture Leidenborn
and Reiff; to clear enemy in its zone; to maintain contact with the 90th Inf
Div on the left; and to be prepared to assist the advance of the 6th AD. The
Corps action ordered for 18 Feb was to be a limited objective attack to the SE
employing initially only the 90th Inf Div and the 11th Armd Div in the center.
The 6th Cav Gp and 6th Armd Div on the south were directed to attack east on
Corps order and the 4th and 87th Inf Divisions were directed to maintain their
defense on the north flank. Division plans for the attack were initiated
without delay. During
the afternoon plans were made by CCR for rotating the 63rd AIB and 55th AIB,
and the shift initiated after dark. Sporadic mortar and artillery fire
continued to fall on the infantry positions. 16
February 1945 The
55th AIB completed its relief of the 63rd AIB soon after midnight. Patrols of
CCR seized and destroyed three annoying pillboxes during the day. The entire
56th Engr Bn, plus 250 men from CCA and CCB, utilizing forty trucks from the
attached QM Truck Company, repaired, improved, and maintained roads in the
division sector. Main axial roads were beginning to show signs of recovery with
constant attention. Taking advantage of the partial penetration of the
Siegfried Line along the north flank of its projected zone, the plan for the
attack envisaged a series of daily leapfrog infantry battalion limited
objective attacks on a narrow front to cut through the remaining fortifications
of the Siegfried Line by flanking action from the north. With CCR through the
fortified area it was then contemplated that CCB would in turn move through the
CCR zone and then attack from the north flank, approaching concrete
fortifications from deep in the left flank and rear. FO #13
was issued at 1200 formalizing such an attack at H-hour 18 Feb with maximum
effort on the left (E) flank to capture Leidenborn and Reiff, and clear the
enemy in the Division zone. Once
again CCR was built up with heavy infantry and supporting armored elements as
the Division was reconstituted as follows: CCA CCB HQ
& HQ Co CCA HQ
& HQ Co CCB 42nd Tk
Bn 22nd
Tk Bn (-B Co) A Co
56th Engr Bn
41st Tk Bn C Btry
575th AAA Bn
21st AIB A Co
81st Med Bn
B Co 56th Engr
Bn Det
133rd Ord Maint Bn A Btry 575th AAA Bn Det
133rd Ord Maint Bn CCR Division
Artillery HQ Res
Comd Hq
& Hq Btry Div Arty 55th
AIB 490th
AFA 63rd AIB 491st
AFA C Co
56th Armd Engr Bn
492nd AFA B Co
22nd Tk Bn C
Btry 174th FA Bn A Co
602nd TD Bn
D Btry 575th AAA Bn B Co
81st Med Bn Division
Troops
Division
Trains Fwd
Echelon Div Hq Hq
& Hq Co Div Tns Hq Co
11th Armd Div
Rear Echelon Div Hq 151st
Armd Sig Co
81st Med Bn
(-) B Btry
575th AAA Bn
133rd Ord Bn (-Det) 575th
AAA Bn (-)
1 Plat B Btry 575th
AAA 56th
Armd Engr Bn (-) 381st QM Trk Co 602nd
TD Bn (-) 659th QM Trk Co CCR, in
close coordination with the 90th Inf Div, was directed to attack at H-hour 18
Feb to successively capture Leidenborn, Hill 545, and Reiff; clearing all enemy
in its zone. Div Arty was directed to support the attack, organized for combat
as follows: 491st and 492nd AFAs in direct support of CCR; 490th AFA to be
available to CCB for direct support on call; 949th FA Bn of Corps 333rd FA
Group to reinforce fires; and the 257th FA Bn to be available on for emergency
missions. Priority of fires went to CCR. Mass fires were directed for the
narrow front along the boundary between the 11th AD and the 90th Inf Div. CCA
was directed to remain in its assembly position and await orders. CCB was
directed to assist the attack of CCR by fire initially and to maintain contact
with the 6th Armored Division on the south flank and CCR on the east flank.
Also directed were preparations to assist the advance of the 6th AAD; the
occupation of Harspelt, Sevenig, and Roscheid; and a mop up in its zone on
order. The 56th Engr Bn was directed to continue road repair and maintenance on
axial routes in the division area and to be prepared to install a bridge across
the Our River at Peterskirche for CCB. A Company 56th Engr Bn was to be
available to the Division Engineer on call for road repair and maintenance. Opposing
the Division, the following enemy units had been identified: 167th Inf Div;
339th Inf Regt; 340th Inf Div; 695th, 696th, and 694th Inf Regts; artillery of
the 79th Inf Div; a total strength of 1,800 men but with apparently no tanks. A
general lull on the division front was utilized by the enemy to send out small
patrols, fire light to medium artillery of harassing nature, and to conduct
small scale position improvements. Prisoner interrogation reports indicated the
enemy had been engaged in a constant reshuffling of troops. Desertions were
frequent and the morale of the German was very low due to a noticeable lack of
food, medical supplies, heavy weapons, and transportation facilities. Since
February 6 the Division had captured 291 PW’s, a large number of whom had surrendered
or deserted at their first opportunity. 17
February 1945 The
sector defense continued simultaneously with preparations for the attack, which
was directed for 0400 18 Feb. CCR and CCB maintained their positions and
contact with the 90th Inf Div on the north and the 6th AD on the south. CCB
infantry elements crossed the Our River at Peterskirche and proceeded one km
south of Lutzkampen to Hill 512 with no enemy contact. Div Arty destroyed three
concrete bunkers and one permanent roadblock with a 155 gun at close range. Two
tank were also knocked out. The
56th Engr Bn was still busily engaged in the constant rebuilding and
maintenance of the critically damaged road net. 200 men from CCA and 240 men
from CCB were assigned to road repair and maintenance work under supervision of
the Corps Engineer. Weather during this period was clear and cool, with fog in
the morning hours. 18
February 1945 Launching
its narrow front sneak attack at 0545, with the 63rd AIB in the lead, CCR
caught the enemy in the midst of a shift of troop dispositions. The vigorous
infantry-tank assault, without the warning of an artillery preparation,
resulted in complete surprise and confusion of the enemy, according to PW
reports. Elements
of the 987th Grenadier Regiment, 267th VG Division were quickly identified as
prisoners began to pour in. Supported by a base of fire at Lutzkampen, the 63rd
AIB recaptured Grosskampenberg at 0805. C Company 56th Engineers blasted two
paths through the dragon’s teeth and a minefield in rear thereof by 0915.
Supported by tanks and artillery fire, the 63rd AIB cleaned out fortifications
to advantageous positions. Maintaining the impetus of the attack, the 55th AIB,
supported by engineers and tanks, passed through to take the first objective,
Leidenborn, by 1700. After dark engineers went forward to construct a bridge in
preparation for renewal of the attack. Small
arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire were encountered during the day. A
total of 72 PWs were captured. Assault troops found, in many instances,
scattered mines and unoccupied trenches around the pillboxes. Most pillboxes
were defended by three to four men. Some pillboxes were vigorously defended
whereas others were abandoned after our troops fired on them. CCB
Engineers completed construction of a Bailey bridge at Peterskirche by 1100.
Div Arty fired 90 missions in support of the attack, expending 1,724 rounds.
Intermittent firing of surrender leaflets on defended towns continued. At 1730,
VIII Corps directed the 11th AD to continue the attack on 19 Feb, in
coordination with the 90th Inf Div. 19
February 1945 The
enemy reacted to CCR’s previous day attack with a company strength
counterattack at 0930. C Company 55th AIB met and repulsed the counterattack
made by elements of the 986th VG Regt of the 276th VG Div armed with rifles and
automatic weapons, and supported by moderate artillery fire. After a “Time on
Target” artillery preparation, two companies of the 55th AIB jumped off at 1330
to seize Herzfeld. The attack was delayed at the edge of the town by extremely
heavy mortar and artillery fire but was driven home and the town secured by
1500. A clearing operation in the general area followed to net a total of 23
pillboxes destroyed or neutralized and 63 PWs captured for the day. The 63rd AIB
cleared the Leidenborn area, improved its positions, and prepared to continue
the attack on Reiff the following morning. A CCB
combat patrol of platoon strength reported no enemy contact in the vicinity of
Sevenig at 1015. As
reconnaissance in the southern zone was stepped up in preparation for the
second phase of the attack, Div Arty continued to support the advance of CCR,
firing 75 harassment and interdiction, target of opportunity, preparation, time
on target, counterbattery, and registration missions; expending 1,244 rounds.
Air observation planes flew 14 missions. 491st AFA fired 26 rounds of surrender
leaflets on Herzfeld at 1600. The 490th AFA, using a captured 88mm gun, knocked
out an enemy vehicle by direct fire. The
56th Engineers continued maintenance and repair of roads. 100 teller mines were
cleared from the road. The road from Weiswampach to the bridge at Peterskirche
was cleared of mines. 20
February 1945 Completing
a narrow penetration of the main Siegfried Line fortifications, CCR launched
its attack toward Reiff at 0700 with the 63rd AIB now in the lead, advancing
rapidly against a progressively disorganized enemy. The town of Sengerich was
seized at 0830. Heavy mortar and artillery fire was dropped in the town shortly
thereafter by the retreating enemy. The 63rd AIB cleared and consolidated all
dominating terrain around Sengerich during the remainder of the day. The 55th
AIB remained in defensive positions around Herzfeld and prepared for the attack
on Roscheid scheduled for the following day. In this brief but vigorous and
determined action, ten pillboxes were seized and destroyed and 52 PW’s
captured. CCB
continued its probing patrol activity and maintained contact with adjacent
elements. Division
Artillery fired a preparation for the early morning attack and during the
course of the day’s close support destroyed an enemy tank. Hostile mortar and
artillery fire was continually minimized by quick action counter-battery
missions. A plan
for the following day’s action was submitted by CCR at 1825, coordinated with
adjacent and supporting action, and approved at 1950 along with orders for a
renewal of the attack. 21
February 1945 CCR’s
mission on this date was a limited objective attack to seize Roscheid and to
clear pillboxes NE and NW of Roscheid to the Sevenig-Roscheid road, widening
the rupture of the main Siegfried Line. Supported by B Company 22nd Tk Bn and C
Company 56th Engr Bn, CCR’s 55th AIB launched its attack at 0700. By 0936 the
assigned mission was accomplished. The 63rd AIB remained in positions captured
the previous day and prepared fo the final assault on Reiff scheduled for the
22nd of February. One platoon of D Btry 575th AAA Bn was attached to CCR for
guarding troublesome civilians at Lutzkampen. A
patrol dispatched from Sevenig by CCB at 1145 to gain contact wit the 6th Armd
Div on the south flank ran into occupied pillboxes enroute and was unable to
complete its mission. Division
Artillery fired on a German troop concentration in Reiff and obtained during
this period four direct hits on enemy tanks. A total of 81 missions were fired,
expending 1,723 rounds. The
41st Cavalry was released from 6th Armd Div control at 1200 and moved back
north to an assembly area in the vicinity of Lascheid at 1800. Meanwhile
the 90th Inf Div, with a toe-hold in the Siegfried Line provided by the
Division’s action earlier in the month, was making steady progress on the north
flank. At about 1600 on this date Binscheid was captured and lateral contact
was being maintained. On the south flank, in conformance with the general Corps
plan, the 6th AD initiated offensive action eastward across the Our River. At 1055
orders were received from VIII Corps for resumption of a coordinated attack 22
February.. The general Corps plan contemplated an accelerated drive to the
south by the 11th AD and the 90th Inf Div, who were then through the main
defenses of the Siegfried Line, to assist in the frontal assault being made by
the 6th AD on the south flank. Fragmentary verbal orders were accordingly
transmitted to the major units concerned without delay. The
attack plans of CCR, CCB, and Division Artillery were submitted, coordinated,
and Operations Memorandum #27 issued at 2000 for completion of the Division
mission the following day. The general plan contemplated a continuance of the
infantry action on the east flank by CCR, while permanent fortifications in the
Siegfried Line to the west were masked by smoke. CCB was then to move infantry
and tanks through the CCR zone via Lutzkampen and Herzfeld, thereafter swinging
SW and clearing their zone in the Siegfried Line by an attack from the left
rear. CCR was
directed to seize and occupy Eschfeld and Reiff successively, in close
coordination with the 90th Inf Div. CCB was directed to clear bunkers and
pillboxes in its zone after capture of Eschfeld by CCR. The normal support
mission was allocated to Dev Arty with specific provisions for coordination of
fires with the 6th AD and the 90th Inf Div in the vicinity of the Division
boundary pinch-out point. 22
February 1945 To set
the stage for the CCB attack CCR’s 55th AIB, supported by tanks and engineers,
jumped off at 0730 from positions east of Roscheid to seize and secure
Eschfeld. By 1000 the town itself was taken and by 1045 surrounding critical
terrain was securely within our hands. This action involved clearing ten
bunkers and netted a total of 74 PWs. At
0815, following a heavy artillery preparation, and with its west flank masked by smoke, the 63rd AIB launched a
surprising mounted infantry and tank attack on the town of Reiff. An hour later
remnants of the 988th VG Regt of the 276th VG Div and the 694th VG Regt of the
340th VG Div had been completely overwhelmed and the town was securely in our
hands. The rapidity of the attack netted a battalion commander and staff along
with an additional 187 PWS. One American M-4 tank being used by the Germans was
recaptured. Immediately thereafter dismounted infantry was sent to the south
and east to clear the remainder of the division zone and occupy advantageous
high ground south of the town of Reiff. A counterattack of two platoon strength
at 1630 was repulsed without loss. Passing
through Eschfeld, following its capture by CCR, the first of two task forces of
CCB attacked SW with tanks and infantry through the Siegfried Line
fortifications, clearing bunkers and pillboxes systematically until the
southern division boundary was reached. By 1320 contact was established with
the 6th AD by the second task force, driving directly south along the high
ground east of the Our River from Sevenig. Division
Artillery fired heavy concentrations on towns in the division zone during the
day’s action, expending a total of 2,662 rounds. Air observation planes were
used to good effect to drop surrender leaflets on towns just before they were
entered by our attacking ground elements, materially reducing the time
consuming mop-up process. The
attack of 22 February ended the Division’s offensive action in the Siegfried
Line. In one partial and one complete breaching of this vaunted fortified zone
the combined arms of the Division, supporting principally dismounted infantry
action, had accomplished the following significant results: Thirty
square kilometers of the main Siegfried Line fortified zone were reduced, as
the Division made advances totaling twelve km on an average 2.5 km front. A total
of 197 pillboxes and bunkers were seized and cleared. A total
of 716 prisoners of war were captured. 23
February 1945 Consolidation
of positions along the Division boundaries and extensive patrol activity was
the principal operational activity during this period. Contact was maintained
with adjacent units, the 90th Inf Div on the east and the 6th AD on the south.
There was no enemy activity, but nine prisoners gave themselves up to our
troops. B Company 22nd Tank Battalion, after 18 days of continuous action, was
detached from CCR and replaced by A Company 22nd Tk Bn. A Company 602nd TD Bn
was released from CCR to join the 90th Inf Div. C Btry 174th FA Bn was released
from attachment at 1500. Based
on verbal orders from VIII Corps, CCA was alerted for movement east to the
vicinity of Hermespand to back up the 8th Inf Div, and warning orders were
accordingly issued. At 1847, Operations Memorandum #25 was received from VIII
Corps directing the 11th AD to assemble in its then location and await orders. 24
February 1945 Patrol
activity and maintenance of outposts in the vicinity of Reiff and Eschfeld were
continued penking a solid juncture of
the 90;the Inf Div and the 6th AD. Reconnaisssance for assembly areas was
initiated and CCA established liaison with the 87th Inf Div. At 1300 CCA was
attached to the 8th Inf Div for a defensive role or repelling counterattacks on
the Corps north flank. CCA was balanced up as follows: 42nd Tk
Bn A Co 56th Engr Bn 63rd AIB A Co 705th TD Bn 490th
AFA C Btry 575th AAA Bn 41st
Cav (-B Trp) A Co 81st Med Bn All men
on engineer details repairing and maintaining roads rejoined their parent units
at 1700, as improving weather and backbreaking work healed the road communication
problem. FO #12,
HQ VIII Corps, was received at 1300,
directing an attack at H-hour 27 Feb to capture Hallschlag and Ormont and to
seize the high ground south of Cronenburg as the Corps turned its attention
directly east toward the Kyll River. The 11th AD (less CCA) was placed in Corps
Reserve, prepared to resume offensive operations on short notice, to capture
the high ground north of Ober Bettingen, or to exploit a breakthrough. Confirming
fragmentary orders then in the process of execution, FO #14 was issued at 2100.
Troops of the Division, other than those attached to CCA previously, were
distributed as follows: CCB Division
Artillery HQ
& HQ Co CCB Hq
& HQ Btry Div Arty 41st Tk
Bn 491st
AFA 22nd Tk
Bn 492nd
AFA 21st
AIB D
Btry 575th AAA Bn B Trp
41st Cav B Co
56th Armd Engr Bn B Co
81st Armd Med Bn CCR Division
Troops Hq Res
Comd Fwd
Ech Div HQ 55th
AIB Div
HQ Co 151st
Armd Sig Co B
Btry 575th AAA Bn 56th
Armd Engr Bn (-) 575th
AAA Bn (-) 705th
TD Bn (-) Division
Trains Hq
& Hq Co Div Tns Rear
Ech Div Hq 81st
Med Bn (-) 133rd
Ord Maint Bn (-) 1 Plat
B Btry 575th AAA Bn 381st
QM Trk Co 659th
QM Trk Co The
order directed CCR to assemble in the area Lascheid-Bracht-Haspelt-Gruflange by
1300 24 Feb, and to release certain platoon and company sized elements to other
units:1 Plat B Co 56th Engr and C Co 56th Engr to parent unit; 1 Plat D Btry
575th AAA Bn to Div Arty; and A Co 22nd Tk Bn to CCB. Div Arty was placed in
general support of Corps and directed to reconnoiter for and move to position
areas in the vicinity of Habscheid, as directed by the Corps Artillery
Commander. 25
February 1945 General
regrouping of Division elements and movement to assembly areas in Corps reserve
marked his period. CCA
initiated movement to the 87th Inf Div area, closing in the Losheim Pass area
near Namderfeld at 1550. B Btry 174th FA Bn and the 161st Smoke Generating Co
were attached to CCA. Under cover of darkness that night the 63rd AIB and 41st
Cav (-) relieved elements of the 87th Inf Div as that division concentrated on
its south flank for an attack to the east. CCR moved to its new assembly area, its command
post opening at Lascheid, Belgium at 1530. CCR released A CO 22nd Tk Bn, B Co
81st Med Bn, and C Co 56th Engr Bn to parent units with movement beginning at
1300. HQ Division Artillery, and 491st and 492nd AFAs moved to Habscheid. 26
February 1945 Maintenance
and rehabilitation were emphasized throughout the division. CCB test fired new
weapons and directed the conduct of combat drills on the proper engagement of
Tiger tanks. Div Arty supported the Corps offensive operation, expending 426
rounds on normal reinforcing missions. 56th Armd Engr Bn parties initiated
route and bridge reconnaissance north and northeast of Bieialf in anticipation
of possible movement to that area. CCA,
under operational control of the 87th Inf Div, completed relief of the 347th
Inf Regt in the line at 1200. Two companies of the 42nd Tk Bn and B Btry 174th
FA Bn were attached to the 490th AFA Bn to increase the volume of fire support
along the Corps north flank, while the 87th Inf Div pushed eastward to the
south of the Losheim Pass. 27
February 1945 Division
Artillery continued reinforcing
missions for Corps Arty. Engineer reconnaissance parties expanded route and
bridge reconnaissance to the N and NE of Bieialf. CCA,
under the 87th Inf Div, continued enemy contact patrolling activities, and fire
support of the infantry attack. At 1100 the 161st Smoke Generating Co was released
from attachment. Plans were made covering the contingency that CCA’s task might
be changed to an attack on enemy positions to the east with the mission of
capturing the Losheim Pass entrance town of Scheid. 28
February 1945 Combat
drills, test firing of weapons, maintenance, and rehabilitation were continued
by the Division throughout the day. Verbal
orders were received from BIII Corps directing the Division to attack through
the 4th Inf Div early March3, push rapidly to the east to capture the high ground
north of Gerolstein and seize crossing over the Kyll River between Ober
Bettingen and Gelstein. The 4th Inf Div was directed verbally to continue the
attack until 2 March and upon being passed through by the 11th AD on 3 march to
continue in zone and clean up enemy bypassed by the armor. The 87th Inf Div,
6th AD, and 6th Cav Grp also were to continue the pressure on a broad front. At the
close of this monthly period, Operations Memorandum #30 was issued regrouping
the major units, and outlining instructions for the attack on 3 March which
will be elaborated on in the succeeding month’s report. Summary The
167th Volksgrenadier Division was defending the sector where the 11th AD made
its attack 6 February, and during that action, which lasted until 11 February,
a total of 261 Pws were taken from the 331st and 339th Regts of that division. South
of the 167th, the 340th Volksgrenadier Division was defending the sector to
which the 11th AD moved as a result of the boundary shift to the south of 111
February. The enemy, believing that VIII Corps would remain on the defensive
for some time as a result of the main Allied effort impending in the north,
started a switch of units. Fortress Battalions, Alarm Companies, Fusilier
Companies, Construction companies, and some nebelwerfer units were used as a
holding force while the 340th VG Division stared a movement north to the Prum
area. The e276th VG Division had already assembled near Lichtenborn, and on 17
February was in the process of relieving the 340th VG Div on the 11th AD front
to reinforce these miscellaneous units. In the
early morning darkness of 18 February our attack completely surprised the 97th
VG Regt which had only arrived a few hours previously, and destroyed its combat
effectiveness except for a few remnants which managed to get back and join the
988th Regt which had not yet come into
the line. General Tollsdorf of the 340th VG Div, in an effort to forestall
complete destruction of the 276th VG Division, ordered the 694th VG Regt of his
division back from the vicinity of Prum to bolster the sagging defense as
piecemeal recommitment of his forces was initiated. On the 19th and 20th the
986th VG Regt of the 276th VG Div was committed with same disastrous results.
By the 22nd of February, when the 11th AD accomplished its mission by capturing
Reiff, the 694th Regt of General Tollsdorf’s 340th VG Div had returned to the
scene, and was thrown in with the remaining 988th VG Regt of the 276th VG Div
to stop the division thrust. Their lack of success is evidenced by the speed
with which the division objective was taken and the capture of 202 prisoners on
that day. In
spite of grueling weather, crippled communications, and limited personnel for
such type close-in deliberate ground action, the combined arms and indomitable
will to win of the 11th AD had produced a significant contribution to the VIII
Corps action in the Siegfried Line, during the month of February. The price in
trained personnel fell principally on the Armored Infantry Battalions where
approximately a quarter of he combat elements were lost. Quick comparative
casualty figures in personnel, as well as vehicles and weapons, are tabulated
below. Casualties
For The Period Our Own Enemy KIA 42 KIA & WIA 465 WIA 442 Prisoners
746 TOTAL 484
TOTAL 1,211 Vehicles
and Weapons Our Own Enemy Halftracks 2 Tanks
(Mark III, IV, & V)
7 Dozers 2 75
mm AT Guns 2 GP
Vehicles 7 GP
Vehicles
20 TOTAL 11 Wagons
46 Artillery Pieces 3 Mortars 5 TOTAL
83 Over
twice as many men were evacuated from exposure and injuries in battle. Strength
of the Division at the close of the period was 622 officers and 9,786 enlisted
men as over a thousand men returned to duty or were sent forward as
reinforcements during the month. Division
Artillery fired about 1,200 missions, expending 24,000 rounds during the month
to inflict the great majority of damage on enemy personnel and materiel. No
tactical air missions were flown in support of the Division due principally to
adverse weather and the static close-in nature of the action. Adding a significant part in the cracking of the Siegfried Line to its notable mid-winter Ardennes action, the 11th Armored Division stood battle tried and ready for an accelerating destruction of the deteriorating German Army.
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