Link-up History 11th Armored Division
CONTACT AT HOUFFALIZE
By BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL J. L. GREENE
16 January 1945 - At 0905, 41st Cavalry of the
11th Armored Division made contact with 41st Infantry of the 2nd Armored
Division in Houffalize, thus terminating the Bastogne Operation so far as the
3rd Army is concerned."
Thus did General Patton in his notes on the
Bastogne Operation refer to the accomplishment of the mission which had been
assigned to a task force composed of troops of the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron. Although it would be difficult for any one of the participants in
this undertaking to condense twenty four long hours into one simple sentence,
it must be admitted that the Third Army commander's note does state
specifically what happened, albeit from the Army Headquarters' point of view.
For those Of us on the ground, the contact established between the First and
Third Armies at Houffalize, Belgium, on the morning of 16 January 45, was the
climax of a struggle against Germans, terrain, and weather.
A month prior to this time, we of the 41st
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had been with the other elements of the 11th
Armored Division in south central England--doubtful that we would ever get
across the English Channel of into combat. When the sudden orders came for our
move, we had no idea Of the seriousness of the situation in Belgium, which
became increasingly apparent as the squadron made a forced march from
Cherbourg to the Sedan-Givet area on the west bank of the Meuse River, thence
across this river on 24 December 1944, "with the dual mission of securing
liaison with British forces on the north and establishing contact with the
enemy Northeast of the Meuse River. It
was not until this date that most of us in the lower units knew that the
Germans had broken through the American lines in the Ardennes section of
Belgium and France, and were attempting to split the Allies. With the crossing
of the Meuse, we knew that we had finally realized our desire "to get
into the fight." For the next twenty-one days we were actively engaged in
the main effort to close "The Bulge" and shut the door to Western
Europe which the von Rundstedt offensive had opened.
The final phase of the fighting in the
Ardennes salient was characterized by the concerted drive by the 1st and 3rd
US Armies on the key town of Houffalize, Belgium, on the Ourthe River, ten
miles north of Bastogne. The 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was the 3rd
Army unit which was given the mission of contacting the 1st Army in the
vicinity of Houffalize. This action by the squadron which terminated the
Bastogne Operation covered a twenty-four hour period which can be discussed in
three phases-the preparation, the move to contact, and the actual contact.
PREPARATORY PHASE
To achieve the proper perspective of this
action, it will be necessary to consider first the preparatory phase--those
few hours immediately preceding the assignment of the contact mission. During
the month of January, the entire weight of the 3rd Army was in the attack
directed at driving the Germans behind the Siegfried Line. The 11th Armored
Division was directed to relieve elements of the 101st Airborne Division in
the vicinity of Longchamps and to launch an attack northwest as far as
Bertogne, and thereafter east to seize and secure the high ground south of
Houffalize.
On the morning of 15 January 45, the 41st
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troop B), attached to Combat Command A,
was deployed along the northern fringe ofLes Asslns Woods in the Vicinity of
Monavllle, Belgium. These woods had been cleared of the enemy the day before
in a dismounted attack by Troops A and C abreast with Troop E (assault guns)
and Company F (light tanks) in direct support. The advance had been made
against heavy mortar fire, some artillery, and moderate resistance from ground
troops armed with automatic weapons. This action had inflicted heavy
casualties on both troops; Troop A experienced particularly severe losses. As
the objectives were attained, it became necessary for Troop D to replace Troop
A in the line, so that the commander of Troop A could reorganize and re-equip
his unit preparatory to resuming the attack on the next day. At approximately
1800 that evening, elements of the 193rd Infantry Regiment, 17th Airborne
Division were moved in to reinforce the squadron. The combined units, airborne
and reconnaissance were prepared to continue the attack on the right flank of
CCA.
Plans for renewal of the attack were changed
the next morning. At 1100, 16 January 45, the squadron was ordered to release
control of its sector to the 17th Airborne Division units and to withdraw from
position, reassemble in the vicinity of Monaville, and then move to the north
and east of Bertogne to protect the northern flank of CCA in its advance to
the east. Company F moved first, at 1300, to the vicinity of Rastadt, and
outposted the roads to the north. At the same time the 2nd platoon of Troop A
was assigned the mission of proceeding Northeast to the Ourthe River in the
vicinity ofGrinvet and to contact patrols of the 1st Army in that area.
Lt. Col. H. M. Foy, the squadron commander,
with the remainder of Troop A, proceeded to Bertogne to report to the
commanding general ofCCA, Brlg.. Gen.. W. A. Holbrook, Jr. I, as squadron
executive officer, was directed to remain in Monaville to direct the movement
of the other troops (Hq, C, D, and E). By 1630, all troops had been withdrawn
and had started to Bertogne, so I closed the headquarters in Monaville and
moved to the new sector.
No sooner had I arrived in Bertogne and jumped
from my halftrack than General Holbrook and Colonel J.J.B. Williams, the
division chief of staff, came up in their 1-ton vehicles, to see Col. Foy. I
reported that Col. Foy was forward with Troop C.
General Holbrook said, "We have another
mission that you and the remainder of the squadron must undertake. This is an
extremely important mission--a "mission, directed by the Army
commander."
I told the general that I had some troops
available and that we could start immediately. What was the mission?
"We must get to Houffalize tonight and
contact the 1st Army as it comes down from the north, General Holbrook stated.
Col. Williams then spoke up, This is a
difficult assignment for anyone because Houffalize is at least ten miles
behind the German lines. But someone must get through to establish contact
with the 2nd Armored Division as it comes down from Achourfe. They may already
be there. General Patton wants this mission accomplished without delay and he
wants this division to do it."
Here is an excellent reconnaissance squadron
mission General Holbrook said. "We've got to get around to the northern
flank of the division and then through the German lines if they extend that
far. It should be interesting"
I instructed the S-3 to alert Troop D, an
assault gun platoon, and any tanks that might be available. Then the general,
the chief ofstaff and I began a serious map study to see just what this
assignment would entail. True, Houffalize was approximately ten miles behind
the lines; was on the dominating high ground; the routes of approach, except
by way of the main highway, were indistinct snow-covered trails through the
woods; and dusk was already approaching.
We had gotten word to Col. Foy that an
important situation had arisen, therefore he came back to the squadron CP.
Then we were able to organize a small task force composed of Troops D and E,
the 2nd platoon of Troop A and Company F. I was placed in command of this
composite group and assigned the mission of proceeding Northeast to meet
elements ofthe 1st Army, believed to be in the vicinity of Houffalize, the
Corps objective.
It will be recalled that the tank company and
the 2nd platoon, Troop A, were on outpost and patrol mission on the combat
command flank. These two units were directed by radio message to rally in the
vicinity ofRastadt, and the commanders were to meet me at the edge of town for
further orders.
Since the morning of 13 January when the
attack began, the full strength ofthe Corps had been focused on Houffalize.
The Corps commander now directed that this objective be reached without
further delay. CCA, organized into two task forces, had been attacking
eastward astride the Bertogne-Compogne-Mabompre road all during the day. An
integral tank task force had pushed rapidly eastward clearing the Pied Du Mont
woods at 1130, Compogne at 1510, Rastadt immediately thereafter, and Villeroux
shortly before dark. During this attack by CCA, the 41st Cavalry had been
moving from Monaville to Bertogne to be employed as the security element for
CCA left flank and as stated had just closed into Bertogne when this new
mission was assigned.
With Troop D and Troop E, I left Bertogne at
1730 advancing Northeast thence east to the previously indicated rallying
point. One platoon of Troop D was sent ahead of the column as the point unit
and to conduct necessary route reconnaissance. Just as we were leaving, a
Troop jeep carrying a seriously wounded sergeant came in from along our
proposed route. The sergeant's jeep had struck a mine some two miles from the
village, and the sergeant believed that there was an extensive mine field
across the field north of the Pled Du Mont woods. If this were correct, the
minefield would be directly across our proposed route of march.
From Bertogne to Rastadt, I rode in my
half-track directly behind the last vehicle of the platoon. The column had
advanced only about two miles when it came to a sudden halt. Anxious to keep
moving as long as there was some daylight, I ran to the head of the column to
ascertain the reason for the delay. The point commander was standing in front
of the lead 1/4-ton.
"What's the trouble, Tousley?" I
asked.
"Major, we've found that mine field. Here
it is, right in front of us and there doesn't seem to be any clear lanes. (He
had checked for about 100 yards on either side of the trail.)
No mines were visible to our immediate front,
but they could be seen just under the snow to the right and left. I noted that
there was evidence that two of motor vehicles had passed through the mine belt
a few feet to the right of the main trail. Not wanting to delay any longer and
not being able to find any bypass, I ordered one 1/4 to move ahead along the
trail--through the mines! The 1/4-ton made it: The other vehicles of the
point, six in all, then proceeded through the same gap. I stood at the
entrance to watch them by.
As the command half-track drove up, I stepped
up on the battery box and motioned the driver forward. In the split second
that followed, there was a terrific blinding explosion and then everything
went black for a few seconds. As I regained my senses, I found myself sprawled
in the snow about ten feet from the badly damaged half-track. A quick check
indicated that no one had been more than badly shaken, but that the half-track
was now immobile. The left front wheel had struck a mine just as the vehicle
started forward.
Realizing that it would now be impossible to
get any other vehicles through the obstacle at this point, I directed that all
effort be devoted to finding a possible by-pass. Shortly thereafter, a soldier
drove up in a 1/4-ton to say that he knew of a route around the mines and
would guide us the rest of the way to Rastadt (he then told me that he had
been sent to meet us and show us the proper route). Had I waited for this
guide of spent motor time looking for this by-pass, I could have saved my
halftrack and some unnecessary strain on the men's nerves. But in my mind
there existed the definite possibility that this minefield could have delayed
me for many hours. I believe that the loss of the half-track and the anxiety
of the men were small price to pay to avoid delay.
After I had commandeered an armored car from
Troop D and reestablished communications with my command and squadron
headquarters, we continued on to Rastadt.
Meanwhile, the other elements of the combat
command were very heavily engaged with the enemy in the vicinity of Villeroux.
These forces were astride the main road and were endeavoring to continue the
advance to the Northeast. At 1910, leading elements of the tank task force,
continuing eastward through a defile between Villeroux and Mabompre, were
heavily counterattacked in the northern flank by enemy tanks, artillery and
antitank fire. As a result, the task force was forced to withdraw to the high
ground west of Villeroux. The enemy was believed to have withdrawn in the
direction of Bonnerue and Houffalize. All of this action had taken place while
I was en route to Rastadt from Bertogne.
When I reached Rastadt, I found that the tank
company and the Troop A platoon were assembled as had been directed. The town
and its inhabitants, civilian and military, were in a state of complete
confusion and excitement. Troops of the CCA task force, driven from position
east of Villeroux, were falling back into Rastadt, which was still burning as
a result of the fighting that had taken place there a few hours earlier. To
add to the confusion, it was completely dark except for the light created by
the burning buildings, and consequently the officers and noncommissioned
officers were having a difficult time reorganizing their units. Captain
Mullins, the tank company commander, told me that he had assembled the other
41st Cavalry officers and noncommissioned officers in an abandoned house
nearby. He knew that I would want to have these men together for the detailed
planning and issuance of orders to effect the accomplishment of our assigned
mission.
I fully realized that it was going to take a
great deal of map study and planning if I was to get this force to Houffalize.
Before any orders could be issued, it was imperative that I, assisted by
suggestions from the other Officers, make a through study of the situation and
terrain that confronted us. This study reemphasized the fact that no one in
our assembled group had ever made a personal reconnaissance of the proposed
area of operations, that it was now completely dark and visibility was very
limited, and lastly, that none of us knew the location of the strength of the
enemy.
The region through which we were to move was
typical of the entire Ardennes locale. There were no main roads--the only road
of any consequence was a single lane dirt road from Rastadt to Bonnerue,
thence north to the Ourthe River at Grinvet; all other routes were mere
logging trails through the forests. The woods were very thick due to the
government's reforestation program. If forced off any road of trail, the only
alternative would be to dismount the men and walk. The map showed that the
only available route from Bonnerue to Houffalize was a trail through the dense
Ardennes--this trail crossing a stream which flowed into the Ourthe River
through a deep valley just west of Houffalize. As if these trials ofnature
were not enough, we were raced with the problem of advancing through a minimum
ofeighteen inches of snow which had undoubtedly drifted in many places. My map
study indicated clearly that the terrain would be as formidable as any enemy
we might encounter.
The meager facts supplied by the CCA elements
that had been in action during the day were the only information we had of the
enemy. The consensus of opinion was that, after the counterattack in the
vicinity of Vellerous, the Germans had withdrawn to the Northeast in the
direction of Houffalize of to the north in the direction of Bonnerue. It must
be borne in mind, however, that any information obtained from combat elements
tended to be slightly colored by fruitful imaginations. After careful
consideration of all known facts, it was clear that contact could be expected
en route in the vicinity of
Houffalize.
Based upon a detailed map study, personal
knowledge of the Ardennes type terrain, and the enemy information available, I
evolved by scheme of maneuver. The task force would advance initially in a
column prepared to split into two forces--a main body and a reconnaissance
unit--where possible. The mission of the so-called reconnaissance unit would
be to continually probe to the flanks for alternate routes. From Rastadt, we
would move in one column for about two thousand yards to a point where a trail
branched to the right Of the Rastadt-Bonnerue road. I anticipated that the
main route would be blocked at this point, and planned to have the
reconnaissance unit select another route of to outflank any hostile force at
this junction.
The column organization in order of march at
this time was as follows:
Reconnaissance Unit
Main Body
Troop D (-1 platoon)
2nd Platoon, Troop A
1st Platoon, Troop E
Company F (Tanks)
Troop E (Assault guns)(-1 platoon)
3rd Platoon, Troop D
My command vehicle, a tank, was located at the
head of Company F.
Upon clearing the woods south of Bonnerue, the
scheme of maneuver called for us to skirt the village to the south and east
and to reenter the woods on any passable trail. The reconnaissance unit was to
locate, if possible, a feasible route around Bonnerue, into the woods, and on
to the objective, avoiding enemy contact in so far as possible.
During this initial conference, no specific
orders for the seizure of Houffalize were issued. This phase of the operation
was still in the preliminary planning stage. However, in my mind, I envisioned
that there were three distinct steps to be taken to assure successful
accomplishment of the mission. These steps were (1) to dispose troops to
observe and contain any Germans still in the town, (2) to seize the high
ground south ofHouffalize as a means of assisting CCA, and (3) to dispatch
patrols across the Ourthe River in an effort to establish a junction with 2nd
Armored Division.
The plan for the advance on Houffalize was
discussed with the key officers and noncommissioned officers. I issued the
necessary orders to implement this plan and directed that all personnel be
thoroughly oriented as to our mission and the steps to effect its
accomplishment.
After these commanders had returned to their
units and briefed their men, I ordered Troop D to initiate the move toward
Houffalize. Troop D was en route by 2300--and a long, tense night began.
MOVE TO CO
When I departed from Rastadt on that night of
15 January 1945, I did so very reluctantly. I had no conception of the
potentialities of the next few hours; indication of enemy locations was
confused; no daylight reconnaissance of the route ahead had been made; and I
had visions of our being another heroic but useless "Lost Battalion. In
spite of these shortcomings, however, I felt that I had a compact, effective
force and a sound, workable plan of operation. The combination of these two
should form a successful team.
I was soon to learn that the plan, as it is
with all others, was subject to change without notice and that it must be
highly flexible to be usable.
Troop D, the leading element, had advanced two
thousand yards when the first change in plans occurred. At the road junction
where the column was to split into two units, we found that we were blocked by
several large craters that had been blown in the trail to the right. The woods
here appeared to have been bombed of heavily shelled and as a result it was
impossible to use the other route. Therefore I ordered the entire column to
continue on the main Axis of advance until we hod emerged from the woods south
of Bonnerue. At this point, I would make further changes that might be
expedient.
I had hoped to bypass Bonnerue by moving
cross-country to the south and east; however, I soon found that this plan was
not feasible. The country was open--not wooded--but the snow had effectively
concealed any possible trails, and cross-country movement would be hampered by
the rugged terrain. The only alternative was to go through the now dark
village.
The movement of the column was by bounds--one
unit moving into and through the town while the other units covered this move.
By this means the entire column succeeded in getting through Bonnerue and onto
the trail to the Northeast without any incidents other than the fact that a
few vehicles deviated slightly from the correct route. (The next morning,
another platoon of Troop A passing through this same village, captured the
remnants of a German company in hiding there through the night.)
Upon reaching the high ground Northeast of
Bonnerue, the task force was reorganized and then continued on its mission.
The nature of the route from here on dictated that we proceed in one column
through the Bois du Couturie to Houffalize. The composition of the column now
was:
2nd Platoon, Troop A
Company
F
Troop D (- 3 Platoon)
Troop E (-1 Platoon)
1 Platoon, Troop E, attached.)
3rd Platoon, Troop D
Now the terrain, the night, and the weather
became our main foes. Progress through this heavy, sinister forest was a slow,
tedious undertaking. Lieutenant Ellenson virtually walked the entire distance
because it was necessary that he constantly check and recheck to be certain
that he kept us on the correct route. Many times the map did not match the
ground in either direction of location; very probably this disagreement was
due to the illusion caused by the deep snow, the darkness, and the nervous
tension. All of the men were "on edge," expecting an attack at any
moment from any direction. Actually, no enemy was encountered during this
movement, but I believe that the presence of a real enemy would have relieved
a great deal of the nervous tension. As it was, the column proceeded slowly,
nervously and anxiously through the long, dark night hoping that the next
minute would bring daylight and the objective.
By 0300, we had reached the bridge across the
Rau de Suhet, about two miles west of Houffalize. Upon arrival, I was greatly
relieved to find it still intact. During my preliminary map study some six
hours earlier, I had made a mental note of how an effective block could be
created by destroying this bridge. However, the Germans had evidently missed
an opportunity to delay our column because the bridge had not been destroyed.
But before I could fully appreciate our good
fortune at this point, I found that across the stream there was indeed an
obstacle, motor effective than any man-made block. Immediately beyond the
bridge the trail went up a steep slope, about forty degrees, which was now
covered by a coat of ice. It was impossible for any wheeled vehicles to move
up this hill under their own power. After several attempts to "rush"
vehicles up the grade and concurrent efforts to hastily corduroy the roadway,
it was decided that the tanks would have to be used as prime movers for the
other vehicles. Consequently, all available grousers, a maximum of two per
tank track, were distributed and the slow process of pulling vehicles up the
one-hundred yard long hill began. While about one third of the personnel were
thus employed, I directed that as many men as possible make maximum use of
pioneer tools to chop ice from the road. Any other men not otherwise busy were
to man the vehicular weapons to guard the column against surprise attack.
The move from the bridge to the top of this
hill took two and a half hours. It was a continual battle against the ice, the
night, and the increasing fatigue. Many men, especially those immobile in the
vehicles, started falling asleep from sheer exhaustion. For this reason, it
was imperative to detail an officer to continually "ride herd" on
the column and to get it reorganized. As each individual vehicle reached the
crest, it resumed its place in the column and awaited those still to negotiate
the slope.
By 0530, all vehicles except the assault gun
ammunition trailers were up the hill, all the men had been awakened, and we
were prepared to continue on our way. The remainder ofthe route was the usual
snow-covered, indistinct trail but without any serious hindrances to our
advance.
At 0630, the column emerged from the Bois due
Couturie and made the descent into the Ourthe River valley. As we rounded an
unfinished water mill at the foot of the hill, our goal came into view some
six hundred yards to the east. Perched on the ridge to our front stood
Houffalize, a prewar resort town, now the focal point of a determined Allied
effort to crush the German offensive.
CONTACT
Up until the moment that the lead armored car
fell into a tank trap, I had firmly believed that the task force could sneak
into Houffalize undetected. But a few minutes after passing a water mill, the
first armored car of Ellenson's platoon dropped through the light coat of snow
into a hastily dug, but well concealed, trap in the middle of the road. We
were within two hundred yards of our target--within sight of Houffalize, but
blocked by one of our own vehicles.
Inasmuch as the assigned mission was to get to
Houffalize and contact elements of the 2nd Armored Division to close the now
famous Ardennes Bulge, we had to go ahead in spite of the armored car. To make
a personal reconnaissance of the approaches to the town and to be able to
report that the task force had reached its destination, I took Lieutenant
Ellenson and walked ahead two hundred yards to the city limits sign. We walked
around this sign a couple of times and congratulated each other upon the fact
that we had finally reached Houffalize.
As we started back toward the column
Lieutenant Ellenson suddenly said to me, "Say, Major, there's someone up
there on the hill to the left. It looks like an OP to me."
I could see where he was pointing and there
did appear to be a man, of two men, in a foxhole. Lieutenant Ellenson shouted
several times in an effort to attract the man's attention, but got no reply.
"Lets go up there," Ellenson said.
"It's probably a 2nd Armored patrol."
Without thinking, I said "Okay," and
we started up the hill. Ellenson hollered to his car commander, Sergeant Till, that we were going up the hill and
would be right back.
We climbed up about fifty yards until we were
within fifteen of twenty feet of the outpost. Our high hopes were dashed to
the ground as the man in the foxhole stood up, trained a machine gun on us,
and shouted something in German. Both of us stopped dead in our tracks and
reflected for a fraction of a second as to what we should do. Ellenson's only
weapon was his flashlight and mine was my pistol, snug in its holster. Before
we could think very much, the German again said something that sounded much
like hands up.
Lieutenant Ellenson threw his flashlight down
and put his hands up saying as he did so, "I guess we are caught,
Major."
I hesitated for a second, just long enough to
shout to Sergeant Till, "This is a German up here--fire at him."
Fortunately, the alert sergeant heard me. He
fired the antiaircraft machine gun in the direction of the German. This fire
diverted his attention long enough for Ellenson to slide down the hill and for
me to jump behind a nearby log. Why the German did not fire at us, I shall
never know. Instead, when fired on, he jumped out of his foxhole and ran back
into town. Ellenson and I hastily returned to the column.
The firing by Sergeant Till seemed to awaken
what troops were then in Houffalize because immediately small-arms, antitank,
and mortar fire began to fall all around us. I directed that the armored car
in the rear be abandoned temporarily and that all other vehicles seek
protection behind the mill--the town dominated the field east of the mill,
which the column had started across.
The sudden outburst of activity made it quite
evident that Houffalize was still occupied by the enemy. If I were to
establish contact with 1st Army units, it would be necessary either to get
into the town, to get patrols across the Ourthe River to the north, of to Just
sit tight until I saw friendly elements approaching from the north and
northwest. I decided to do all three things in combination.
The plan at this time was to contain the
German troops in the town by assault gun (75mm) fire from our present
position; to dispatch Troop D dismounted to the high ground south of the town
to report what enemy of friendly activity they observed; and to have the tank
company push closer to our objective on either side of the river. The
remaining unit, Ellenson's platoon, was to keep on the alert to detect the
approach of any friendly patrols.
I reported by radio to squadron headquarters
that patrols had reached the objective; that it was still occupied by German
troops; and that as yet no contact had been established with the 2nd Armored
Division. In return I received a message to the effect that CCA would continue
its attack at about 0800, astride the Mabompre-Houffalize road, and therefore
to be alert for the approach of these troops from the south; also, that there
was no additional information as to the location of First Army troops north of
the river. I later learned that CCA and CCB of the 2nd Armored Division were
disposed along the high ground some 1500 yards north of our position.
I would have known the exact location of 2nd
Armored Division troops earlier if arrangements had been made at squadron of
division headquarters to establish direct radio communications between the two
divisions. As it was, the only contact was through Army channels. Quite
possibly, "on-the-spot" contact between the two armies would have
been established hours earlier had the two advancing divisions been in radio
of telephone communication.
At about 0800, Troop D reported its dismounted
men in position. From the high ground, this troop could observe activity in
Houffalize and its environs. Thus they could report the movement of enemy
reinforcements into the town of the approach of CCA from the southwest. In
addition, these men were well situated to provide forward observation
personnel for the control of the assault gunfire.
With reference to assault guns, I came to the
conclusion that it would be possible to place only one platoon (two guns) in
firing position in the vicinity of the mill. The most forward platoon, 1st
Platoon, Troop E, was moved into the open field just fifty yards east of the
mill. True, this was a vulnerable point, but it was the only suitable firing
position in the immediate area; however, the enemy mortar and small-arms fire
from Houffalize was sporadic and inaccurate. I believed that the Germans were
firing unobserved harassing fire and that their field of fire was limited.
Once the assault gun platoon was in position, it opened fire on the town in an
effort to neutralize enemy forward observers and antitank weapons. While these
guns were firing, the troop commander, Captain Krivak, was making a
reconnaissance for favorable positions for the other four guns. He recommended
that these platoons fire by indirect fire methods from their positions in the
column. This I approved. The method of indirect fire was made possible and
effective by use of the Troop D forward observers located on the high ground
overlooking Houffalize.
Now that I had a firm base of fire and a
holding (of observing) force, I was especially desirous of getting a
maneuvering force into use. I planned to use the light tanks for this purpose.
With this in mind, the tank company commander, Captain Mullins, and his other
officers and senior noncommissioned officers conducted a thorough
reconnaissance for suitable routes. They were looking for a means of getting
into Houffalize either by crossing the Ourthe of by swinging to the south and
entering the town through Troop D's position--the frontal approach to the
objective was under German observation and the armored car was still blocking
the road. All reconnaissance to the river and along trails other than the main
one proved futile. There were no vehicular bridges of fords across the river
and all other trails were effectively blocked by felled trees interlaced
across them. The only tank approach to Houffalize was the route we were
on--across the field dominated by the town itself.
I directed that, under cover of assaulting
fire, a tank be sent forward to pull the armored car out of the trap. This was
done, only to cause an appreciable increase in small-arms fire which began to
become increasingly effective. The tank threw a track as it was just starting
to pull the armored car free. Consequently, another tank was dispatched to
complete the job. After several unsuccessful attempts, the disable vehicle was
pulled clear. At this moment, heavy mortar fire began to fall on the exposed
assault gun platoon. This fire had telling effect as it hit in the trees over
the guns r the tree bursts caused a shower of shell fragments on the open
turret vehicles below. The platoon leader and several men were seriously
wounded by these fragments; therefore, I ordered the guns to move back out of
the position.
Simultaneously with the mortar attack, heavy
artillery fire began to fall on the Troop 1) positions. From my position, I
could observe this fire and believed it to be friendly artillery fire coming
in from the northwest. This belief was confirmed in a few moments by the troop
commander as he requested permission to abandon his position. I ordered Troop
D to move out of the impact area but to remain in a position from which they
could continue observing to the north, south, and east. This change was
subsequently reported to squadron headquarters along with a request that steps
be taken to lift the 1st Army artillery barrage.
A few minutes before 0900, Lieutenant Ellenson
reported that his platoon could see troops moving across the high ground
directly north on the opposite side of the river. As I turned my attention in
that direction, I too could see dismounted men moving southeast across the
high ground about 1500 yards away. Being quite certain that these men must be
the 1st Army troops, I directed that a patrol be sent out to establish
contact. The patrol was to proceed with due caution to avoid trouble, should
be men we saw prove to be retreating Germans. There was also the probability
that our own patrol might be mistaken for an enemy unit. However it was
difficult to restrain the desire of all the men to dash out and establish the
initial contact themselves.
As the patrol was dispatched, I also directed
the tank company to make a determined effort to get into Houffalize. This they
were to do by moving due east along the now cleared trail, thence to the high
ground south of the objective, and into the town from the south. The mission
of the tank company was not to capture Houffalize single-handed, but rather to
conduct a lightning harassing raid to determine in so far as possible the
German strength in the town. Captain Mullins was told to move into the town,
make a rapid tour of that portion south of the river, and then to withdraw to
the high ground where Troop D was situated. From his position on the hill
south of town, he then could assist Troop D in its overwatching mission and
cut off any Germans being forced back by the CCA attack.
Company F had little difficulty getting across
the open ground, receiving only small-arms and mortar fire as it advanced.
There was no opposition to its move to the high ground because troops in the
town had no good fields of fire. The tanks then moved into the town firing
37mm and machine guns, setting fire to buildings, flushing several Germans
from houses, and then withdrawing to their previously designated positions.
I was observing all of this action but at the
same time anxiously awaiting word from the contact patrol. From our positions,
we could see motor and motor troops trudging through the snow on the far side
of the river. Certainly these must be the long awaited 1st Army elements.
Events moved rapidly thereafter. The patrol
returned a few minutes before 1000 to report that it had contacted elements of
the 41st Armored Infantry, 2nd Armored Division. The juncture between the 1st
and 3rd Armies had been established, thereby eliminating the Ardennes salient
that the Germans had created in the Allied lines a month before. The mission
assigned the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had been accomplished.
I immediately reported this initial contact to
squadron headquarters and requested further instructions. In reply, I was
notified that the squadron commander was en route to my position and that a
platoon of Troop A had contacted patrols from the 334th Infantry Regiment and
the 82nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (2nd Armored Division) farther west
along the Ourthe at about the same time that we had contacted the 41st Armored
Infantry. Seemingly, the two armies were now joining forces all along the
river.
Upon arrival, Colonel Foy directed me to
maintain my present position until CCA had reached Houffalize. He said that
their attack was well underway and that I could expect them to reach the
objective within two of three hours. The squadron commander then went with the
contact patrol across the river to meet the 41st Armored Infantry commander
for a comparison of future plans.
Upon his return from the personal liaison
mission, Colonel Foy gave me an account of his discussion with the 41st
Armored Infantry commander, reiterated his instructions as to my actions
pending CCA's arrival, and then returned to the squadron command post, which
was still in Bertogne.
For the remainder of the day, our mission was
to keep Houffalize and its approaches under observation and to report the
progress of CCA. The combat command was advancing steadily up the road from
the southwest, being delayed by a scattered, retreating enemy using road
blocks and mines to great effect. This CCA attack was coordinated with the
advance of CCB and the 101st Airborne Division from the south. Shortly after
1300, elements of the 42nd Tank Battalion, CCA, reached their objective, the
high ground south of and overlooking Houffalize--the position occupied by the
light tanks and Troop D. Through the remaining daylight hours, the balance of
CCA closed on the objective; the position was organized for defense; and close
contact between units was established all along the line. Control of the
Houffalize sector passed to CCA at 1600.
At 1630, the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance
Squadron task force withdrew to the squadron CP at Bonnerue, leaving an
outpost on the trail west of Houffalize, and patrols along the south bank of
the Ourthe River to maintain the contact with 1st Army units along the
northern bank.
The impression made by this single operation
on the officers and enlisted men involved was deep and effective. By forced
application over a compact twenty-four hour period all personnel suddenly saw
the need for and value of months of pre-combat training. Without Lieutenant
Ellenson's keen ability to read a map under extreme pressure, the column
certainly would have been led astray and might never have reached the
objective. Throughout the action, teamwork between men and units; between
tanks and dismounted men; and between assault guns and well-located forward
observers was acutely apparent to all concerned. Likewise, no one could help
but notice the distinct reliance placed on radio communication to achieve
maximum coordination with a minimum of effort. In addition, there were many
instances demonstrating the soundness of scouting
and patrolling techniques; need for detailed prior planning; effective small
unit leadership; and a variety of other basic elements of reconnaissance unit
and individual training.
The contact mission as assigned the CG 11th
Armored Division was, I believe, an ideal reconnaissance squadron undertaking.
The requirements for the success of this type of assignment are: a high degree
of mobility; maximum surprise; varied, effective firepower; flexible
communications; and well organized dismounted men. All of these necessary
factors were present within the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. The
specific mission possibly could have been accomplished by either tank of
armored infantry units of the division as effectively, but not without a
diversion of effort of a sacrifice of strength in the main attack. Moreover,
the reconnaissance squadron, possessing the tools necessary to accomplish this
mission, was readily available to the division commander.
The
successful accomplishment of this special mission is another example of the
capability of a reconnaissance squadron to execute any mission which it may
reasonably be assigned. Because of the flexibility and versatility of this
type organization, it forms an integral part of the support echelon of the
armored division.